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ABSTRACT 
Since the mid-1990s, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC) has led the 
Navy's Information Operations (10) support to the Fleet. Within the FTWC manning 
structure, there are in total 36 officer and 84 enlisted Naval Reserve billets that are 
manned to approximately 75 percent and located in Norfolk and San Diego Naval 
Reserve Centers. These Naval Reserve Force personnel could provide support to FIWC 
far and above what they are now contributing specifically in the areas of Computer 
Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception and Civil Affairs. 
Historically personnel conducting 10 were primarily reservists and civilians in uniform 
with regular military officers being by far the minority. The Naval Reserve Force has the 
personnel to provide skilled 10 operators but the lack of an effective manning document 
and training plans is hindering their opportunity to enhance FTWC's capabilities in full 
spectrum IO. This research investigates the skill requirements of personnel in 10 to 
verify that the Naval Reserve Force has the talent base for 10 support and the feasibility 
of their expanded use in 10. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of 
lies. 
Winston Churchill 
A. FUTURE WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Information Operations (10) is Information Warfare (IW) conducted in all 
engagement phases from peacetime through conflict. It consists of Military Deception 
(MILDEC), Operational Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
Electronic Warfare (EW), Physical Attack/Destruction, and Computer Network 
Operations (CNO) (Ref 8, p. II-3-5). Presently, the Navy is concentrating on EW, 
OPSEC, MILDEC, Physical Destruction, and Computer Network Operations. The Fleet 
Information Warfare Center (FIWC1) is also expanding into PSYOP with systems such as 
the Transportable AM/FM Radio Broadcast System (TARBS) but is having difficulty 
developing operational procedures due to limited manning and few skilled PSYOP 
personnel. The Navy has much to offer in the softer side of 10 but fails to realize the 
complexity of PSYOP. PSYOP is more than just high technology (Ref 1, p. 70). 
Personnel manning is the most vital factor in every facet of 10 and this resource is not 
being optimized. Properly trained personnel in the core competencies of 10 are critical 
and the Naval Reserve FIWC (NR FTWC) organization must be expanded and effectively 
utilized to meet the demands of the fleet. 
1
 Pronounced fT wick 
The future of warfare may predominantly involve 10 with many developing 
countries looking at ways to oppose the United States in an unconventional asymmetrical 
manner. Desert Storm demonstrated that confronting the United States military in a 
conventional symmetrical manner will not succeed. 
Such a war is unlikely to recur because the perpetrator must deploy 
immense numbers of troops and will suffer enormous losses from 
American firepower (Ref 2, p. 218). 
Future battles involving large conventional forces such as major tank engagements seem 
unlikely in the years ahead. However, lower intensity conflicts could become the norm 
and warfare may be primarily conducted through media and networks on the information 
plane. 
Since the advent of the Information Revolution and the rise of the INTERNET 
as a primary communication medium in the business world, the awareness of Information 
Operations has grown significantly beyond the Department of Defense (DOD), which has 
always verified its importance: 
Information systems have become essential ingredients to the success of 
combat operations on today's battlefield (Ref 3, p. 55). 
Protection of these systems from the plethora of potential future attacks has become a 
high priority. 10. does not singularly exist within computer networks but within all 
information providers and exchanges such as the mass media through Public Affairs (PA) 
and personal interaction through Civil Affairs (CA) personnel. 
Cyberspace and information media have become the new battlespace, which 
drives the need for personnel with high levels of education and training. Personnel with 
technical backgrounds are being drawn away from the military services due to the high 
demand of the civilian world and the offer of high salaries. In the Information 
Technology (IT) field, this is even more extreme with personnel receiving their training 
in the military and then leaving the service for the civilian job market. Officer and 
enlisted salaries are not sufficient to retain these individuals on active duty. However, 
many do stay in the reserves after they separate from the service. They have successful 
careers as computer consultants, computer programmers, computer engineers, 
information technology managers, computer security specialists and consultants. Others 
have advanced degrees in psychology, history, political science and other social science 
disciplines along with business personnel with years of marketing and sales experience. 
These individuals could form a strong support structure of IO expertise for the Navy both 
in peacetime and surging for conflict. 
B.        INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
In finding personnel to support the needs of Navy IO, the type of individual 
capable of conducting IO must be identified. This research is focused on historical 
evidence to see how IO personnel were obtained and how activities were conducted in the 
past through the history of deception operations. These operations give tremendous 
insight in how to improve IO operations today by examining feats of deception conducted 
during past conflicts. Individuals such as Dudley Clarke and his 'A' Force during World 
War II which ran the deception operations in the Mediterranean and Colonel John Bevan, 
who coordinated deception operations in London for the Allies are a few of the characters 
that need to be explored to find out what makes an IO expert. 
This research aims at answering several questions: (1) What are the skill and 
education requirements for 10 personnel? (2) Are there civilian equivalent careers that 
support the 10 skill set? (3) How can Naval Reserve personnel effectively support 10 
warfighting? This research hopes to improve 10 organizations such as 10 Cell support 
shown in figure 1, by emphasizing the need for optimizing the available talent to support 
10 warfighting through the use of personnel in the Naval Reserve Force. The key link to 
10 success is in the support of FIWC to enhance its ability to perform full spectrum 10 by 
expanding the utilization of Naval Reserve Forces in areas such as the unique skills and 
talents the Naval Reserve Force can provide. 
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SERVICE AND FUNCTIONAL 
COMPONENTS 
CA Civil Affairs 
CI Counterintelligence 
CISO CI Support Officer 
EW Electronic Warfare 
EWO Electronic Warfare Officer 
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JSOTF Joint SO Task Force 
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OPSEC Operations Security 
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PSYOP Psychological Operations 
REP Representative 
SO Special Operations 
STO Special Technical Operations 
Figure 1: Information Operations Cell (From Ref 8) 
II.  HISTORICAL REFERENCES TO INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS 
The lie is so precious that it should be flanked with an escort of truths 
Brigadier Dudley Clarke 
A.       HISTORY OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Extensive deception operations were conducted in the past and the Navy should 
learn from history the methodology used and the personal attributes of those involved. 
This chapter investigates personalities in deception operations to determine what their 
characteristics and traits were in order to discover the profile of an 10 officer. Through 
the characteristics of these individuals, future 10 warrior characteristics can be 
extrapolated to the desired IO systems and concepts of today. 
Information Operations bases much of its premise on Information Superiority 
through advanced communication networks. During the Napoleonic Wars, Admiral 
Horatio Nelson had information superiority over his opponent with an advanced 
communication system, which allowed Nelson to control his ships effectively in battle. 
The first alphabetic signal book developed by and named after Home Popham put a 
flexible, comprehensive, and instantly communicable range of signals at a sea 
commander's disposal (Ref 7, p. 49). The French had no such system and suffered 
severely during the Battle of Trafalgar. Lacking vital information, the French Admiral 
Villeneuve, lost all control of his forces and ultimately was defeated (Ref 7, p. 88). Prior 
to the Battle of Midway, the United States Navy broke the Japanese code, which allowed 
the Navy to read Yamamoto's battle orders which gave the United States a good 
indication of when and where the Japanese would strike (Ref 7, p. 186). A careful 
examination of history demonstrates that information superiority is a key ingredient that 
5 
has always been a factor in warfare. Protecting information flows and gaining 
information superiority has long been part of warfare and was just as critical 200 years 
ago as it is today. Warfare has only changed in that information moves faster and there 
are more avenues for information to travel. 
The establishment of 10 has merged pre-established concepts and supporting 
functions such as Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Operations Security, 
Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Electronic Warfare. The creation of computer networks 
has brought Cyberspace into the warfare role with Computer Network Operations. The 
synergistic goal of 10, however, is that it: 
Involves actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one's own information and information systems 
(Ref8,pl-1). 
The British, during World War n, synergized their efforts and were able to utilize 
information to affect the German decision-making process. They used "turned" double 
agents against the Germans for the enhancement of security and to deceive the enemy 
(Ref 9, p. 37). The Enigma code-breaking machine was used to break through 
Germany's information security, which allowed the British to read secure German traffic. 
The British also used active deception techniques to shape German perceptions of reality 
by planting false letters on a body during OPERATION MINCEMEAT (Ref 9, p. 143- 
150). British operations used every sort of information warfare tactic with the exception 
of Computer Network Operations since it had yet to be invented. 
1. Orchestrators Of Information Operations 
The Allies had an impressive TW organization during World War II which paid 
great dividends and helped defeat Nazi Germany.   They formulated the first integrated 
6 
IW organization out of sheer necessity in order to coordinate operations at the urging of 
General Wavell and Brigadier Dudley Clarke (Ref 10, p. 50-51). The participants 
referred to the art that they conducted as strategic deception. Today, it would be viewed 
as full spectrum IW. These wide ranging and highly secret organizations managed to 
fool the Germans time and again as to what the Allies were planning. 
These early IW organizations were primarily made up of personnel who were 
not regular military officers but rather, 
A collection of uniformed civilians ranging from Dennis Wheatley-bon 
viveur, man-about-town, gentleman vintner, and author of popular thrillers 
and tales of the occult- to "stockbrokers to manufacturers of soap to a 
small part character actor"(Ref 10, p. 51). 
These unique individuals were fairly flamboyant and could be considered adventure 
seekers who seemed to have enjoyed conducting these very special operations (Ref 10, p. 
51). Their organization was a network set up by the British in World War II and 
coordinated by individuals such as Brigadier Dudley Clarke, Colonel John Bevan, 
Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, and many others. They all had similar traits in 
personality as schemers and planners with the skills to manipulate and deceive. 
Colonel Noel Wild led the IW efforts in Operation OVERLORD with his Ops B 
staff (Ref 10, p. 53).    Their operations encompassed the full range of Information 
Warfare under one commander: The use of EW in the bombing attacks on German radar 
installations which knocked out all except for the Pas de Calais radar; Deception and 
PSYOP which included the heavy bombing of the Pas de Calais area, the establishment 
of the First United States Army Group (FUSAG), a decoy army, under Patton; the 
utilization of Counter-intelligence by feeding double agents information to pass to the 
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Abwher, which convinced them that a landing was taking place at the Pas de Calais; 
OPSEC, which kept this operation entirely hidden from the enemy by effectively 
compartmentalizing the operation; and exploiting the communication and information 
structure of the Germans by breaking the codes. 
One essential ingredient in Clarke's plans was the information derived 
from Ultra, since it was only through the reading back of the German 
signals decoded at Bletchley Park in England that he could tell whether the 
cover plan was working and whether any of our agents had been blown 
(Refll.p. 101). 
Full spectrum IW of the day was conducted over all information media available to 
convince the Germans of the attack on Pas de Calais. 
a. Skilled Civilians in Camouflage 
The British recognized the skills of civilians in uniform and did not treat 
them as: 
Long haired artists in uniform but as specialists who could make an 
important contribution to the battle (Ref 12, p. 95). 
They recruited artists, architects, and film producers and directors as camouflage and 
deception experts. 
They were lucky in the small unmilitary group of artists, architects, and 
film producers who arrived in Cairo in the early part of 1941-men not only 
with artistic vision but also able to use materials with imagination (Ref 12, 
p. 95). 
These individuals had a unique understanding in staging the art of deception and the 
concept of color and contrast to hide movements in order to deceive and to make military 
equipment appear invisible.    During the North Africa campaign, these camouflage 
experts were challenged with finding ways to hide tanks and other vehicles from German 
reconnaissance planes and bombers. They derived the idea to use ten tons of rotten 
Italian flour and two thousand gallons of Worcestershire sauce unfit for human 
consumption mixed together to form a thin paint. This mixture gave the vehicles the look 
of sand and effectively camouflaged them from the Germans. They also created dummy 
artillery pieces from old petrol tins, cement, tubular scaffolding, and netting to conceal 
artillery*pieces. Also, buildings were painted with darkened areas to suggest bomb 
damage (Ref 12, p. 97). The lesson learned in this operation was that 
Camouflage was too complex to be left to amateurs (Ref 12, p. 97). 
In order to be effective in these creative operations, officers and men would have to be 
trained in several technical aspects, and senior officers would have to understand what 
was meant by terms such as disruption, background, behavior, counter shading, the 
interpretation of air photographs and deception (Ref 12, p.97-98). Military personnel are 
not trained in art concepts. However, because of their non-military background these 
civilians in uniform understood these concepts and were able to derive seemingly 
unconventional ideas that worked effectively. 
b. Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, Royal Navy  Volunteer 
Reserve (RNVR) 
LCDR Ewen Montagu, RNVR, the author of the "Man Who Never Was" 
and one of the masterminds behind the Sicily invasion deception plan as well as a major 
player in the Normandy cover plan, was. a barrister2 before the war. 
2
 Lawyer 
It was a marvelous piece of luck that the officer who handled naval 'Ultra' 
happened to be, in civil life, a barrister, trained to see the point of view, 
and anticipate the reactions, of an equally acute opposing counsel (Ref 9, p 
9). 
The organization which Montagu joined, the RNVR, was established before the war, and 
formed a supplementary reserve organization from civilians who had some basic nautical 
skills. Since Montagu was a sailing enthusiast he figured that the RNVR was for him and 
when he was called to duty, it was discovered that his civilian experience as a barrister 
should be brought to good use for the Royal Navy. He was sent to the Naval Intelligence 
Department and promoted to Lieutenant Commander.  From there, his skills and talents 
were used to run double agents in Britain and to help form several deception plans 
against the Germans (Ref 9, p 16-22).   One operation that he orchestrated, Operation 
Mincemeat, was to devise a plan to deceive the Germans of the obvious invasion of 
Sicily, and to convince them into thinking it was going to occur in Sardinia and the 
Balkans. The operation called for a body to be "planted" where the Germans could gain 
access to the corpse's parcel of false plans for the invasion of Sardinia and the Balkans. 
They used ingenious ideas to create a fictional staff officer, Major Martin, by creating a 
credible past with a girlfriend and even indebtedness. Montagu's group placed personal 
letters on Major Martin between two high-ranking flag officers with joking references to 
"Sardines" to convince the Germans that an invasion was going to occur in Sardinia and 
not Sicily.  However, the planted material had to be subtle so as not to draw suspicion. 
When a submarine delivered the body and it washed ashore in Spain, the Germans were 
able to get access to the briefcase that held the letters and believed the information 
because the character that was carrying the letter was credible and the information was 
not blatantly open about the operation (Ref 9, p 143-150). 
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c. Colonel John Bevan, Royal Army 
Colonel John Bevan was an investment banker in civilian life and became 
the second Commander of the London Controlling Section (LCS) after the first 
commander asked to be relieved due to lack of political support (Ref 10, p. 50). Colonel 
Bevan was very well connected politically and became the ideal officer to lead the 
section. Being married to the daughter of an Earl and having a Field Marshal as a brother 
in law was certainly beneficial. Even more influential was his friendship with Churchill's 
Chief of Staff, General Hastings Ismay and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field 
Marshal Sir Alan Brooke (Ref 10, p. 51). This gave him the distinct advantage of getting 
the visibility needed to get operations approved and to be heard at the highest levels. 
d. Colonel Newman Smith, United States Army National Guard 
Colonel Newman Smith had intermittent military experience as an enlisted 
man in the Philippines, fought with General Pershing in World War I as an officer in the 
National Guard commanding a machine gun battalion, and was a banker and financier. 
He became the head of the Joint Security Control (JSC) for American strategic deception 
as the American counterpart to Colonel Bevan. 
e. Lieutenant Commander Harold Burris-Meyer, United States Naval 
Reserve 
LCDR Harold Burris-Meyer was the head of the Navy directorate at the 
JSC. He was a professor of theater and director of research in sound at Stevens Institute 
and worked in developing the sound for the movie Fantasia. He put his talents to work in 
developing sonic deception equipment for the Beach Jumpers (Ref 10, p52). 
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/. Lieutenant Douglas Fairbanks, JR, United States Naval Reserve 
Lieutenant Douglas Fairbanks, JR, USNR, a popular actor of the 1930s, 
joined the Navy during World War JJ. After serving time at sea, he was transferred from 
sea duty to Lord Mountbatten's Staff with the Royal Navy. There he observed British 
Commando operations and even trained with them, and after going on a few amphibious 
raids, he developed the idea for creating a tactical deception unit for the Navy following 
similar guidelines of the British Commando Units. After convincing the Amphibious 
Group Commander in the Atlantic, his idea was forwarded up the chain of command to 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) office that created the first Beach Jumper Units. 
These units saw action in the Mediterranean Sea and were crucial in diverting numbers of 
enemy troops from the main invasion points. This unit further developed into the Fleet 
Tactical Deception Group and eventually became the Fleet Information Warfare Center 
today (Ref 13). 
2. Commonality Among The Deceivers 
What is most notable by the majority of the officers conducting deception was 
that they generally were not regular military. The exceptions were leaders such as 
Brigadier Clarke, Colonel David Strangeways and Colonel Noel Wild (Ref 10, p. 54). 
Several other regular military officers were present but were generally in the minority. 
This was because Clarke staffed "A" force with: 
Sprigs of the Establishment, male and female, preferably with something 
colorful about them, and. with people of somewhat flashy 
accomplishments, such as a famous racing driver (Ref 10, p. 51). 
Reservists and civilians in uniform dominated the deception organizations. 
12 
Since most were civilians and many were well connected politically, it gave these 
individuals a unique perspective and capabilities to conduct IW on the different levels 
from strategic to tactical. These political connections were beneficial in that IW/IO has a 
strong political element with the politicians heavily involved in the flow of information. 
Prime Minister Churchill's referencing of certain goals and objectives in speeches 
assisted the deception plan and Colonel Bevan's connection greatly benefited the 
organization. 
With these operators of deception in the past being mostly civilians in uniform, 
the use of the Naval Reserve force to support 10 should be apparent. The Naval Reserve 
Force is the link to the civilian world with civilians putting on uniforms one weekend a 
month and utilizing their specific expertise, developed in the civilian world for use in the 
active military. Many have the similar characteristics of the deceivers of the past and 
may be the 10 warriors of the future. 
13 
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III. THE NAVAL RESERVE 
Employment of the capabilities of the Total Force (active, reserve, 
guard, and civilian members) increases the options for the commander 
and complicates the choices of our opponents. 
Joint Vision 2020 
A.       NAVAL RESERVE BACKGROUND 
The Naval Reserve Force was established in 1917 as an augmentation force to 
active units and to backfill the frontline forces while the country mobilizes for war. 
These individuals are doctors, lawyers, salesmen, teachers, grocery store managers, 
advertisers, computer programmers and other professionals who give up time to serve 
their country. One weekend a month they drill at a reserve center or facility completing 
four four-hour periods following the guidance in their training program. A vital part of 
our defensive readiness posture is having these individuals on short notice to fill vital 
support missions to the fleet. 
The Naval Reserve Force, however, is still essentially being operated the same 
way it was over 80 years ago when General Pershing was assembling the American 
Expeditionary Force in 1917 (Ref 14, p. 54). It consists of over 150 Naval Reserve 
Centers throughout the country in every one of the 50 states and several territories (Ref 
15). These centers are where the majority of the reservists conduct their weekend 
training every month, with some conducting this training at their gaining commands such 
as Naval Reserve Force ships. Annually, reservists must go on active duty for a period of 
between 12 -17 days referred to as Annual Training (AT), and can either be completed at 
the command where they would be activated or another active duty organization.  This 
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entire training period is often insufficient to train individuals in many areas of warfare 
required to maintain a significant level of proficiency. 
Rather than train in this format, reservists could perform functions related to their 
civilian careers. Naval Reserve officers generally fill billets related to what they did on 
active duty, however, many have not driven a ship, launched a missile from combat, or 
conducted a damage control drill in several years. It is not uncommon for a computer 
analyst to have a billet as a reserve maintenance officer of a Shore Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity so that he or she is in a paying billet. The Navy could use this 
computer analyst in a better way. 
B.       USE OF RESERVES TODAY 
The use of the reserves has been expanded today to provide contributory and 
direct support to active forces in times of crisis.  The rotation of reserves to Bosnia is a 
regular operation and reserves are activated for six-month recall to fill watch officer 
positions as requested by the regional Commander's In Chief (Ref 15).   This is critical 
because this is an area where the military can utilize skilled personnel that it cannot fill 
by hiring middle managers from the civilian world as lieutenants. Time is needed to train 
military officers and the system is not designed to cross civilians from the commercial 
sector into the military at the mid-grade officer level because they have to be trained from 
the bottom up within the organization.  The civilian world does not have this restriction 
upon it and regularly draws on experts from other companies to provide new impetus and 
to bring in new ideas. The only place where the Navy can draw such assets is from the 
Naval Reserve Force on active duty recall or special work assignments.   For example, 
Captain Menez is on a three-year active duty recall as the Chief Information Officer of 
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the Naval Reserve Force to provide Information Technology expertise that he acquired in 
the civilian sector (Ref 17). 
The reserves have been taking the lead in several mission areas due to fiscal 
constraints. There has been a political shift away from defense spending toward budget- 
deficit reduction. This is driving a new dependence on Naval Reserve assets and 
capabilities to meet the Navy's peacetime commitments (Ref 16, p. 55). Units such as 
the Marine Inshore Undersea Warfare Units, Inshore Boat Units, and Composite Naval 
Coastal Warfare Units provide unique services to the fleet such as harbor defense that are 
only offered by the Naval Reserve. With the prevalence of computer expertise in the 
reserves there may soon be a trend in shifting the computer forces of the future to the 
reserves. In December 2000, Department of Defense released the fact that the Reserves 
would play a much larger role in Information Operations due mainly to their skills in 
Information Technology. According to Deputy Defense Secretary Rudy DeLeon, 
Members of the Reserve and National Guard are often way ahead by the 
very nature of their civilian employment, trained in their workplaces to 
exploit technology (Ref 18). 
Reservists work for major technology firms that are driving the speed of connectivity and 
advanced software development such as Sun Systems, Cisco Systems, and Microsoft. 
Computer Security and reliability of information systems are critical to their success in 
business and even more so with telecommunication companies such as ATT, Nortel, 
SPRINT, and MCI who must have reliable and secure systems to protect themselves from 
attack or manipulation.    Granted that phone lines are often stolen but telephone 
companies must maintain a high degree of reliability in order to stay in business (Ref 3, 
p. 158). Security and reliability of computer systems in the civilian world require just as 
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much durability and reliability as military systems. If a corporation like SPRINT cannot 
maintain reliable connectivity, it goes out of business. The personnel who maintain these 
systems are what the Navy needs for supporting CNO. 
Retaining officers who separate from active duty in the reserves is the starting 
point in keeping their talents within reach of the military. As these officers and enlisted 
personnel gain civilian experience and advanced education, the Navy can use these new 
found talents for its own purpose. This is already being done in the Naval Air Reserve 
with airline pilots flying P-3s, C-130s, or C-9s during their weekend drills (Ref 15). 
Naval Reservists solve difficult problems in their civilian professions and can bring that 
expertise to the Navy. Activating Naval Reservists for short periods of time to work on 
Active Duty for Special Work, which is a funding program to bring in reservists for 
periods of six months to three years at a time, would be beneficial to places like the Naval 
Postgraduate School where the Reservists could teach what they have learned in the 
business world. 
1.   Joint Reserve Virtual Information Operation (JRVIO) 
The military has already seen the need to use reservists in 10 by creating the Joint 
Reserve Virtual Information Operations (JRVIO) organization to provide support for 
Joint Commander's in Chiefs (CINC), Information Operations Technology Center 
(IOTC), and National Security Agency (NSA).   The hope in this organization is that it 
may generate cost savings to possibly improve recruitment and retention of highly skilled 
IT professionals and reduce the need to rely on contractors (Ref 19 p. 2). It will primarily 
start in the form of watch standing and other qualifications for their weekend drills at the 
various bases.  The JRVIO will not be a fixed unit but reservists provided from all the 
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separate services reserve forces scattered throughout the country that will only work for 
Joint Commands and not the individual services. The unit will also be loosely controlled 
by a single commander but they will still belong to their respective services. 
The organization will be centered on three groups for the IOTC; Community 
Coordination Group (CCG), Analysis and Assessment Group (AAG), and Advance 
Technological Group (ATG). The CCG will be involved in technological sharing, 
requirements coordination, and Planning, Exercise and Operations Support. They will be 
overseeing technology and technical data exchanges between developers and customers. 
The AAG will conduct Systems and Vulnerability Analysis, Modeling and Simulation, 
and Technical Analytic Support. The ATG is to provide technology analysis, technique 
development and technical support. Similar requirements have been delineated for duties 
to the Defense Information Operations Group at National Security Agency (NSA), Joint 
Information Operation Center (JIOC), and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). 
The main disadvantage of these groups is that they will not be a single unit but scattered 
about the country on different weekends. This drives up the cost of travel that could be 
used to fund and support other Information Operations initiatives that provide the Navy 
with Information Operations support. With the reservists scattered to different 
commands, unit cohesion will not exist and their ideas are not being fostered within a 
designated unit to solve problems for the fleet. Keeping reservists in units together will 
allow the reservists to generate new ideas on approaching Information Operations while 
keeping their thinking "out of the box." 10 units will also allow reservists to provide 
services to the service arms and Joint Commands without having to spend money for 
travel and housing costs for they could do it virtually.  Virtual support is the long-range 
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plan for the JRVIO and the money saved could be turned around to pay for equipment for 
the NR FTWC organization (Ref 19). Ships and mobile units require extensive 
Information Technology (IT) support for their LANs and other computer technology 
systems. These systems are more susceptible to attack due to poor management, 
improper use of or lack of firewalls, and other system related problems and the Naval 
Reserve can support these areas. The United States Army Reserve (USAR) has already 
realized this fact and is establishing 10 centers throughout the nation to utilize the IT/IO 
expertise of their reservists (Ref 35, p. 14-15). 
The JRVIO is initially utilizing reservists primarily as computer watch Standers 
and not in the other areas of 10 where they can provide support. The long-range plan for 
the JRVIO, however, is to support full spectrum IO (Ref 19). The final report on the 
JRVIO also states that the long-range goal is to provide support to the Joint Commands 
through the reliance on virtual operations (Ref 19, p. iv). This idea entails utilizing the 
INTERNET or Secure Internet Protocol Network (SJPRNET) to connect reservist to 
perform their duties remotely. The utilization of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
technologies is also being investigated which may alleviate the need for SIPRNET. This 
will allow reservists in remote locations to participate in the program who do not have 
SIPRNET access in their specific reserve center or drill site. 
Virtual organizations can lead to several challenges as identified by the JRVIO 
working group: 
Creating a "virtual organization" would present a set of unique challenges 
including how to monitor unit and individual performance, how to ensure 
sufficient security measures for unit equipment and personnel, and how to 
retain quality personnel over the long term (Ref 19, p 2). 
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The concerns of the JRVIO can be alleviated by utilizing existing reserve units for IT/IO 
personnel with computer Local Area Networks (LAN) with INTERNET access and 
secure facilities. These units could be located at reserve centers to conduct IT/IO 
missions and commanding officers could evaluate performance, ensure security measures 
for equipment and personnel, and handle retention problems for the unit. These units, 
however, will primarily provide services to their own branch services but also support the 
JRVIO infrastructure. NR FIWC is one such organization that could perform this 
mission. 
2.   Naval Reserve FIWC Organization 
FIWC does have a Naval Reserve augmentation unit and a detachment located at 
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center Norfolk VA and Naval Reserve Center San 
Diego respectively. These units are not utilized to their fullest potential due mainly to an 
out of date manning document and training plans. The training plans indicate only 
minimal 10 training with a single 20 hour CD-ROM course on IW. The unit and 
detachment in total consists of 36 officers and 84 enlisted personnel (Refs 31 and 32), 
which is a large reserve support force that has potential to support FIWC in CNO, 
PSYOP, MJLDEC and Civil Affairs. These personnel are already paid for by FIWC and 
could be used to provide a return through usage in 10. 
These units originated out of the same organizations as FIWC but have not been 
reorganized to support modern 10 as FIWC has. The NR FIWC reserve manning 
document indicates a major focus on Electronic Warfare and very little in CNO, PSYOP, 
Deception and no CA support (Refs 31 and 32). Training guidance is inadequate in that 
many training plans have not been updated for some time with few specialized 10 
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training requirements. The reserve management system cannot place effective or desired 
individuals into these billets because the manning document and training plans do not 
indicate desired 10 skills other than Electronic Warfare (Refs 31, 32, and 33). These 
documents also drive school requirement justification and other training that could be 
provided from reserve funding to train HWC reserve personnel. Proper delineation of 
required skills will assist reserve management in identifying personnel with the needed 
skills that FIWC desires. Training plans are the main indicators of the readiness of Naval 
Reserve units and being out of date and inaccurate impacts the overall readiness of 
FIWC. Updating these documents should be of a highest priority. FIWC's Reserve 
Liaison Officer (RLO) is working with the reservists in the local Norfolk unit and is in 
the process of updating the manning document and the training plans (Ref 34). 
Using reservists to directly support the active forces has become a reality in future 
defense planning. JRVIO and contributory support missions are initial means to utilize 
10 resources that are found in the reserves. Expanding the FIWC reserve organization 
into an FT/IO organization to support the JRVIO initiative can solve many of the 
problems that are delineated in Reference 19. Concentrating these individuals in 
detachments will also make their talents accessible to the Navy for more efficient and 
effective use. Requirements, however, need to be established as to what skills are needed 
by the active forces before the NR FIWC manning document and training plans can be 
effectively rewritten. 
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IV. SKILL REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
A.       INFORMATION OPERATIONS SKILLS AND THE RESERVES 
The breadth of Information Operations ranges from the newest technology to the 
oldest concepts of psychology and human nature. Training and education are critical in 
developing extremely diverse individuals with the ability to understand both technical 
and conceptual ideas to conduct integrated 10. The Naval Reserve has personnel with 
experience in 10 related professions giving them an advantage because they pursue this 
10 related career full time. The military, in turn, can use that skill and education to serve 
its needs. The principle skills that are required of Information Operations experts are 
computer oriented skills including networks, operating systems, and programming, 
understanding advanced physics and engineering, social science knowledge in human 
nature, cultural diversity, linguistics, psychology and sociology, and military 
understanding on how to integrate these facets into a conceivable plan to influence the 
decision making process of an opponent. Intangible skills such as guile, cleverness, 
creativity and imagination cannot necessarily be taught and may be inherent in the 
individual. These skills must be identified by senior leadership such as Rear Admiral 
John Godfrey when he discovered Ewen Montagu's talents during the Second World War 
(Ref9,p. 27). 
Though Joint Pub 3-13 does not directly identify skill sets, it does imply what the 
personnel in the 10 organization must be able to do in preparation of the battlespace. Of 
the six areas listed in Joint Pub 3-13 five are critical in defining skill requirements for 10 
such as: 
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Knowledge of the technical requirements of a wide array of information 
systems (Ref 8, p. 11-12). 
This specifies an individual with extensive knowledge of computer and information 
systems and personnel on active duty may not obtain experience with multiple 
information systems with Navy focus on IT21. 
Not all mission areas of 10 are transferable to the civilian world and certain skill 
sets are more fully developed in the Navy. The 10 cell will be optimized with the 
synergy of frontline forces experience in Fleet operations with the reservists' abilities in 
Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception 
(MELDEC), and Civil Affairs (CA). 
1. Computer Network Operations 
Computer Network Operations consists of three distinct areas. Computer 
Network Attack, Computer Network Exploitation and Computer Network Defense. 
These areas are distinctively different but all have the same common skills requirements 
in that individuals conducting such operations must have expertise in the areas of 
computer networks and even programming skills. With the INTERNET expanding at an 
exponential rate with 2 million new users entering every month, more and more 
individuals and businesses are becoming reliant on computers. The need for experienced 
personnel is a concern for the Navy to protect its systems and to potentially prevent an 
opponent from using theirs (Ref 4). 
Computer Network Attack is operations: 
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to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and 
computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves (Ref 8, p. 
GL-5). 
This requires personnel with skill and talents and a first-hand knowledge of how 
computer networks operate. The ideal personnel for such activities are those individuals 
who initially designed the programs such as the civilian employees of Microsoft, Oracle, 
and Cisco. They are prime candidates in understanding the weaknesses in their own 
systems through which to gain access. 
Computer Network Exploitation is similar to attack but the object in exploitation 
is to not be noticed while exploiting the enemy's system so as to use the information for 
intelligence purposes. Exploitation is not discussed in the Joint Pub 3-13 but should be 
addressed as being different from attack. 
Professionals use stealth and superior skill to accomplish clandestine 
missions. Evidence of their activity is rarely detected (Ref 21, p 6). 
Exploitation is more common in corporate espionage when copying data without being 
noticed is more beneficial because being noticed can leave a trail, thereby alerting the 
company that it has lost its secrets and may need to respond in kind (Ref 21, p. 163). 
This is similar to military exploitation because the information received will more likely 
be better intelligence if the opponent does not know that its plans are revealed. 
The Allies conducted the exploitation of Axis information media extensively 
during the Second World War. This was done through exploiting the media of double 
agents and "feeding"3 information to the Germans.   Reading decoded messages in the 
3
 Feeding was the term used in giving the double agents information. It is derived by whether or not 
the Germans "ate" the information as discovered by reading secret messages decoded by Ultra. 
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Ultra program further exploited their internal communication network to assess the 
success of whether the bait was "eaten." This exploitation of the German information 
network gave the Allies Information Superiority over the Germans (Ref 9, p. 36-45). 
Computer Network Defense or Information Assurance (IA): 
Protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring 
their availability, integrity, identification and authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation (Ref 8, p. BT-1). 
This subject area covers intrusion detection devices, firewalls, virus scanners, encryption, 
and various other defense postures that are needed to protect information. The civilian 
sector produces the majority of these products such as Raptor firewalls and virus scanners 
such as McAffee and Norton. The military has already shifted to commercial off the 
shelf products to protect their systems. This is an indication that the Navy is not leading 
in computer technology but is only following the commercial sector lead. Since the 
civilian market is producing the security tools and hacker websites are places where 
hackers can share scripts on how to break into systems, there must be a way to obtain 
those skills for use in the Navy. 
The reserve force has an advantage over the active forces in computer skills 
because many reservists work in these fields full time vice getting a shore tour in a 
computer field and then heading back to sea. Poor retention rates of skilled network 
personnel exacerbates the problem with the high demand for these skills in the civilian 
world along with the higher salaries: 
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Expertise to run and maintain both the old and the new technology in the 
Navy's inventory is expensive, particularly when the Navy is losing many 
of its military and civilian experts to the private sector. This is happening 
because the private sector is better organized to constructively use the 
expertise; offering better corporate packages; using state of the art 
technology; demanding a great need for their expertise; and providing the 
necessary training that the Navy commands are unwilling or unable to 
provide (Ref 22, p. 63). 
Figure 2 shows the number of Information Technology Professionals with Masters 
Degrees in the Naval Reserve as of 5 May 2001. Not all of these individuals have the 
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Figure 2: Masters of Science Degrees (From Ref 24) 
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With the increase of Computer Network Attack and hackers throughout the world 
breaking into computer systems such as Ardita4, there needs to be a cadre of individuals 
with computer skills in the Navy (Ref 3, p 197-9). Advanced network training and 
computer language skills are hard to maintain if one is not working in the field 
continuously. Line officers must go back to sea to be competitive for promotion and 
restricted line officers have a similar rotation and must complete tours in successive 
billets in order to be competitive. Creating a new community has been suggested but this 
would not resolve the retention problem (Ref 22, p. 62). Trying to make personnel on 
active duty highly skilled in a market where the civilian world would lure them away 
from the Navy is not advantageous. 
4
 Julio Cesar Ardita, hacker name (El Griton) hacked into the Harvard University computer system and 
from there further hacked into DOD, NASA, and other University sites in 1996. He was a 21 Year old 
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Figure 3: IT Professionals (From Ref 24) 
The skills required are not specifically delineated but if it is extrapolated from 
reference 8, then we can assume that a computer expert must be able to do two things: 
Identify information systems value, use, flow of information, and 
vulnerabilities. 
Determine the most effective capabilities for affecting the vulnerable 
portion of the targeted information or information systems (Ref 8, p. II- 
1/2). 
This implies that the person must know multiple computer systems and networks.  The 
active forces are focused on IT21 and not the variety of other systems in the commercial 
sector (Ref 23, p. 24). Due to the nature of their civilian work, reservists have superior 
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knowledge of the variety of systems in use in the business world. They have a greater 
variety of computer specialties as Figure 3 shows and already have a significant number 
working in these fields. Utilizing reservists is cost effective because they essentially do 
not have to be trained nor paid full time and the civilian work experience makes them 
more effective. 
What the active force needs is basic computer system training to conduct basic 
operations of the systems in use today. If Microsoft Certified Systems Engineering 
certifications are required then they should receive that training. To keep them in after 
this initial period, they should receive equivalent retention pay to balance the salary 
difference with the commercial world. This would keep the basic level of skilled 
personnel in the Navy to handle everyday business. The advanced security training for 
assistance and network design should be shifted to the reserves where the expertise is 
already there. 
The Naval Reserve has the computer skill base on both the officer and enlisted 
levels to assist the Navy or to provide a Computer Incident Response Team support. 
Naval Reserve support to Computer Network Operations should be increased due to the 
expertise shown in Figures 2 and 3, which shows what many reservists do on a daily 
basis at their civilian jobs. Their specific skills are very refined and the Navy does not 
have to pay to train them since the civilian corporations have already paid the training 
costs. This is a nice turnabout for the military that routinely spends millions to train 
pilots only to see them leave for the commercial airlines. The civilian corporations can 
train these people and the military can utilize them. 
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2. Psychological Operations (Social Sciences/Communications) 
PSYOP skills deal with both technical skills in radio communications and 
conceptual skills such as psychology', sociology, and cultural studies. The overall 
concepts of influence that include reciprocation, social proof, authority, commitment, 
consistency, liking, and scarcity are the basics of PSYOP (Ref 26, p. xiii). These are the 
influence patterns that the advertisers and marketers target to influence people to buy 
their product and PSYOP personnel use these theories to get an opponent to buy their 
story. Strategic PSYOP planning deals with the entire theater and the central message 
that is being circulated, while tactical PSYOP uses these ideas to create the way in which 
this influence is carried out. 
The skill requirement for Strategic PSYOP is related to the social sciences. 
PSYOP are actions to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences (Ref 8, p. II-4). 
Therefore, personnel with advanced degrees in the social sciences can effectively support 
PSYOP. These individuals often have excellent understanding of the cultural, social, and 
psychological implications of an action and the likely reaction of an opponent. Personnel 
are needed who are trained in understanding the human psyche and cultural implications 
such as psychologists, sociologists and other human factors related fields. 
People from different cultures think differently (Ref 27, p. 11). 
This is why cultural understanding is so critical and sociologists and cultural experts have 
just as important a role in PSYOP as psychologists. Together, these people will develop 
the overall PSYOP plan for the tactical personnel to carry out. They must ensure that the 
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products being developed by the PSYOP personnel are accurate and will relay the correct 
message. 
Strategies, which consciously or unconsciously disregard culture and other 
aspects of the human dimension in conflict invariably invite failure (Ref 
27, p. 11). 
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Figure 4: Ph. D's in Social Science Field from Ref 24 
Tactical PSYOP require a creative outlook with artists developing the artwork and 
pictures to relay the message to the target audience, linguists to translate the message in 
the correct dialect, and personnel to deliver the message and to provide entertainment to 
the enemy in order to best sell the message that is being sent. 
Selection of media-and of course several may be used concurrently- 
becomes a complex task of estimating cost effectiveness of the several 
media alternatives (Ref 27, p. 13). 
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This accurately describes marketing and advertising career fields in getting the message 
to the right people, using the most cost-effective media, and relaying the right message. 
This talent is not developed in the military but is found in the civilian world as shown in 
Figure 5. 





























Figure 5: Business Related 10 Professions (From Ref 24) 
PSYOP operators also need to have tremendous amounts of creativity to come up 
with unique ideas on how to get the enemy to change the way they think. Artists that 
draw leaflets that send a message, scriptwriters who know how to tell a story, and 
producers who know how to bring the entire plan together can be effectively utilized to 
orchestrate PSYOP. These are skills that civilians in the broadcast and communications 
world use on a daily basis. 
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10 is all about telling the story and getting your opponent to believe it.  Cultural 
experts can identify the proper media and message needed. 
If the message is encoded improperly according to culture, language, etc., 
(the human dimension), the message sent is invariably not the message 
received and Information Operations fail (Ref 27, p. 10). 
What will offend the people and what will convince them to think in a different way are 
the main considerations. Producers and screenwriters can come up with the plan on how 
to create a viable scheme. They must be able to make it believable and have people 
accept it. This is also where advertisers and marketers come in, especially individuals 
involved in the international market. These talented and experienced professionals know 
how to sell things to people of different cultures. In many respects, IO is all about selling 
ideas vice selling products. 
3. Deception 
Deception is the old name for full spectrum 10 during World War II. Today it is 
still a major component of intelligence work. Dudley Clarke's view was that the goal is 
to deceive the opponent. Make the enemy think in a certain way and to encourage them 
to respond in a certain manner (Ref 10, p. 52). Deception is an intricate building block of 
alloflO. 
Strategic deception incorporates similar skills and backgrounds as PSYOP. 
Figures 3 and 4 are quite applicable to deception and many psychological techniques are 
used. The best description for the understanding of what strategic deception skill 
requirements are can be defined by Brigadier Dudley Clarke in two of his six rules on 
deception that: 
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1) All cover plans should follow not dictate the real plan. Any attempt to 
fit reality to the deception is doomed to failure. 
2) All cover plans should be based on what the enemy himself not only believes 
but hopes for (Ref 35, p. 14). 
These two rules follow the psychology of influence theories of commitment, consistency, 
and social proof. Everyone believes that the attack will land at one point, then the 
information is provided to reinforce this preconceived notion. Once the enemy is 
committed to this view, they will stand by their belief that that is what is going to happen. 
The understanding of these concepts is critical to planning and personnel in Figures 4 and 
5 can be the core foundation for any 10 organization. 
Operational deception deals within theater deception plans and blends in closely 
with tactical deception in some aspects. 'A' Force and Brigadier Clarke were 
professionals at this and created phantom armies in the field to confuse German 
intelligence gatherers in constructing decoy airfields with decoy planes, supply dumps, 
motor pools, and encampments along with false troop movements announced through 
radio transmissions and other means (Ref 10, p. 49). They played an important role in 
fooling Rommel as to where Montgomery's main force was during the Battle of El 
Alamein (Ref 10, p. 49). The skills needed require knowledge of modern tactics as well 
as an understanding of what the enemy will be looking for so as to take advantage of 
these actions. 
The mental attributes of the personnel who conducted 10 during World War II is 
described in Chapter EL   Skills such as those possessed by good lawyers who can out 
think his opposing counsels and who have the ability to step into the shoes of their 
opponents and see what he is visualizing are vital.   Corporate America must out think 
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their competition in order to stay on top of product development, sales plans, and 
advertising, all of which utilize these concepts. It is not surprising that the majority of the 
London Controlling Section and Dudley Clarke's "A" force were civilian businessmen 
before the war (Ref 10, p. 51). The keys to their success were cunning, guile and an 
insightful understanding of Brigadier Clarke's theories and concept of operations. 
4. Civil Affairs 
The Civil Affairs (CA) aspect is an area of 10 that has already shifted primarily to 
the Reserve Force. CA entails the four functional areas of government economics and 
commerce, public facilities, and special functions, which range from public education, 
price control, public works, and environmental management. The single active Army CA 
battalion also has the added missions of dislocated civilians and cultural relations. These 
mission areas easily relate to the civilian world with businessmen understanding 
economics and business practices, teachers in education, public works with civil 
engineers, and environmental management with wildlife managers. These are skills that 
are not really conducive to the military with the exception of public works which is why 
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Figure 6: Civil Affairs Related Professions (From Ref 24) 
Figure 6 shows the vast number of Naval Reserve personnel with careers in 
education along with numerous environmental professionals such as environmental 
scientists and technicians. Civil engineers from the Civil Engineering Corps can provide 
assistance in the area of public works such as the Navy Seabees to CA. Each of these 
mission areas can be supported easily with the use of the Naval Reserve Force. With the 
Navy not having a CA force, a Naval Reserve organization could provide ample liaison 
capability between FTWC and the Army Reserve CA commands. 
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Figure 7: Language Skills 4 or higher (From Ref 24) 
Linguistic skills are extensive in the Naval Reserve as shown in Figure 7. With 
critical needs in several linguistic areas such as Chinese and Arabic, the Naval Reserve 
maintains a large supply of these specialties. Language specialties such as Polish, 
Vietnamese, Russian, Korean, Hindi, and many other languages too numerous to list are 
commonly found in the reserves. This offers a core expertise in areas of the world where 
conflict may arise and the active military has not had the time to train linguists. 
Army Reservists in CA have successfully performed missions during DESERT 
STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, MAINTAIN 
DEMOCRACY, JOINT ENDEAVOR/FRY, JOINT GUARD, and JOINT FORGE. 
They have already proven themselves to have the skills required to handle this mission 
area and do it effectively in current military operations. 
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B.       RECRUITING 
A Naval Reserve 10 infrastructure must be organized to optimize the use of these 
specialized reservists so that the active forces can harness their skills. With an 
organization, the Naval Reserve can effectively recruit the desired personnel for the 
active 10 components. Within the existing billet infrastructure of the NR FIWC 
organization, billets and training plans can be modified to identify these individuals so 
the right individuals can be placed in the right positions. 
The main environment to find linguists, cultural experts, and social scientists are 
at major universities with students and professional academic personnel fitting many of 
the skills that are desired. The Army Reserve focuses its recruiting for reserve PSYOP 
and CA units on colleges for linguists and for communications personnel (Ref 28) 
because many of these students have the needed linguistic skills and cultural expertise of 
various areas of the world. Those studying China, for instance, generally have linguistic 
and cultural expertise in that area. They often have already traveled there and are 
familiar with the people and a few even have excellent political experience from their 
studies. 
Another area of cultural expertise may be found is in the business world. 
International businessmen will also have the required skills along with linguistic and 
cultural knowledge with further advantage in understanding the psychology of influence. 
The advantage of both academic and business personnel are that their viewpoints are not 
affected by military thinking. They see people and cultures differently and have a 
different understanding of what will influence or affect them. 
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Colonel Noel Wild states that he thought that intellectually minded individuals 
(especially legal) were not the best civilian material for recruitment (Ref 11, p. 10). His 
discussion had to do with the idea that deception was not an intelligence matter but an 
operational one and he and Dudley Clarke were able to discount such ideas. The use of 
lawyers and intellectuals, however, proved successful in the case of Ewen Montagu and 
others in 'A' Force and the LCS. Wild's claim may be based on resentment of 
intellectuals since he himself was not one. Wild even had difficulty getting into the 
service in 1924 because of his fear of passing the entrance exam (Ref 11, p. 80). 
Technological centers such as Silicon Valley, Seattle, and Atlanta to name a few 
are excellent areas for recruiting 10 personnel. Corporations have the best and the 
brightest people working for them and these centers are locales, where active recruiting 
can take place. These locations also have large reserve centers where an NR FTWC 
detachment can be placed for the consolidation of prospective reservists. Consolidation 
will make it easier for the active duty military to utilize these resources. 
As discussed, the Department of Defense has already discovered that the 
Reserve Forces have the required skill sets in the Information Operations arena and have 
begun creating a Joint Reserve Virtual Information Operations (JRVIO) organization. 
This is a start where the reservists with 10 potential can go and provide their expertise to 
the Joint Forces. The services should follow this initiative and increase the utilization of 
the reserve 10 infrastructure to service their own requirements such as the Army Reserve 
is presently doing. 
This NR FIWC organization can take advantage of the skills the reserves already 
possess to provide service to the fleet. The JRVIO will not be utilized for support to the 
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Navy, only the joint commands. FTWC needs to expand its use of its Naval Reserve 
organization to consolidate 10 talent to foster creative thinking for support to the Fleet. 
These units should be manned with reservists who have the talent base shown through 
Figure 2-7. 
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V. NAVAL RESERVE 10 ORGANIZATION 
A.       UTILIZATION    OF    NAVAL    RESERVE    FLEET    INFORMATION 
WARFARE CENTER (NR FIWC) DETACHMENTS 
FIWC's existing reserve force consists of the augmentation unit at the Naval and 
Marine Corps Reserve Center Norfolk VA and the detachment at the Naval Reserve 
Center, San Diego CA that are not being utilized to their fullest potential (Ref 34). This 
chapter will provide a clear idea of the capabilities and uses of NR FIWC detachments 
located in areas where reserve 10 talent is concentrated so as to optimize acquiring 
personnel for direct support to FIWC and the Fleet. 
1.   Naval Reserve FIWC Detachments 
NR FIWC detachments are a means with which to utilize the 10 expertise in the 
Naval Reserve for support to the Fleet and even the JRVIO. The existing unit and 
detachment can be broken down into smaller and more manageable detachments that can 
provide both remote and local support to FIWC. With an already large manning structure 
of 36 officers and 84 enlisted personnel billets, detachments can be broken down easily 
into four separate organizations with two collocated with FIWC in Norfolk and FIWC 
detachment San Diego. The other two units can be placed in high technology centers 
such as San Jose in Silicon Valley and Atlanta optimizing the recruitment of reservists 
with extensive CNO experience. 
The local detachments can use the existing services and capabilities at the active 
duty sites but the remote units will need to have their own facilities. Local Area Network 
(LAN), INTERNET access, SJPRNET and higher-level secure access depending on 
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missions assigned to the unit should be installed for their use. These assets need only to 
be in their local reserve center in which a Special Compartmentalized Information 
Facility (SCIF) with SIPRNET access can be built. This is needed due to the inherent 
requirement for OPSEC and Information Security (INFOSEC) in Information Operations. 
Accessing systems while conducting vulnerability analysis may accidentally result in a 
Top Secret Special Compartmented Information (SCI) discovery, requiring security to 
prevent public disclosure. These systems will also support virtual assistance to FTWC 
and Fleet CINCs, Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA) and the JRVIO. 
Training and guidance should be conducted with agencies involved in similar 
operations to improve efficiency and effectiveness; however, the overall training will be 
done in the reservists civilian work experience vice fleet training. FTWC should train the 
reservist information and provide reserve personnel initial indoctrination on research and 
developments in 10. After that, FTWC will be able to draw upon these assets to provide 
support to missions and projects. 
2.     Naval Reserve FIWC Detachment Support in Computers Network 
Operations 
Having virtual capability NR FIWC detachments can provide support in the form 
of CNO support or to provide assistance for web page design or even consultation. 
FTWC could use these reservists in their IT support shop, Red Team arena, Web Risk 
Assessment Vulnerability Analysis and Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment 
Team (Ref 5). Consultation and system assistance is what many of these reservists do 
during their full time careers and can provide this expertise' to the Fleet through 
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Individual Duty Training Travel (E)TT) and AT support. FIWC can gather requests for 
contributory support and reservists can meet the needs when they drill on the weekend. 
NR FIWC detachments will be able to provide support to the JRVIO remotely 
from their secure facility in their reserve center. For example, a watch shift could occur 
on a Friday night, monitored virtually from the reserve center, and continued on Monday 
morning. Watch bills and coordination would be the responsibility of the commanding 
officers of these units. The cost savings in travel alone will pay for the budget of the 
LAN system, workstations, Tl lines, and software. 
3. PSYOP/MILDEC Support 
FIWC could use reservists to support PS YOP/MTT ,DEC operations, doctrine, 
tactics, area planning, and liaison with Army PSYOP and CA battalions for joint support. 
Naval Reservists educated in Psychology or the social sciences are what are needed to 
man these detachments to support these areas. Supplying FTWC with linguists, artists, 
cartoonist, broadcasters, advertisers, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists 
would expand its skill base and give them a solid foundation of expertise on which to 
build. Personnel with doctoral degrees in these areas have instant credibility when 
dealing with civilians at other agencies when it comes to discussing professional theories 
and concepts. Using reservists would establish closer relations with organizations such 
as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilians who are academically on par with many 
of these individuals to effectively relate to them (Ref 6), 
PSYOP, MUDEC, and CA cover the second largest contribution that the NR 
FTWC detachments could make.   Cultural understanding is critical in order to find out 
what will influence various peoples/nations and ethnic groups including the importance 
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of religious holidays and social values. The NR FIWC detachments would provide this 
talent and expertise for consultation and discussion on ramifications of actions planned or 
considered. For instance, Ramadan in Muslim countries is an important event and must 
be understood and respected to prevent any slight to the country that is being influenced 
including allies. 
NR FIWC detachments can also man the Transportable AM/FM Radio Broadcast 
System (TARBS) and provide personnel to train with it during exercises similar to how 
the Army operates their PSYOP organization. This would aid in dealing with the issue 
on how to employ the TARBS by having one of the NR FIWC detachments own and 
maintain it. The system would have a support structure that would provide ownership 
and skilled operators. Procedures and tactics derived for using the system would be 
exercised by a core group of individuals who, combined with their civilian backgrounds, 
could maintain a high level of proficiency. 
4. Cost Effectiveness 
The low cost implication of these detachments will be driven by the fact that the 
computer systems for the remote detachments will only be required to be purchased 
because the detachments can install it themselves. There would be no contractor costs 
other than the DSL line being connected. As information systems experts, they could be 
given a fiscal budget to purchase and upgrade their own equipment thus saving the 
government tens of thousands of dollars in contractor fees. The systems to be used must 
be fully integrated into FIWC, NTWA and JIOC so as to readily provide support to these 
organizations.   Tl lines, Video Teleconferencing systems, and SIPRNET access will 
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allow the unit to be anywhere virtually at anytime. This will alleviate the problem of not 
being collocated and to provide support to the JRVIO. 
Activation of these units to support FIWC and the fleet will not necessarily 
require them to travel anywhere but to their own reserve center due to the virtual world in 
which they work. This is a cost savings to the government and will have them online and 
working while their activation processing is on going. Waiting three to four days to get 
the unit activated to provide support may be a critical. This was critical in the Gulf War 
when the 193rd Special Operation Group Pennsylvania National Guard was able to deploy 
an already activated unit to the Gulf while still mobilizing the rest of the unit (Ref 25, p. 
3-5). 
What makes the reserves an excellent place to grow the Information Operations 
expertise is that they do not have to transfer every two to three years because many 
promote into the next higher grade billet in the same organization. They can remain in 
these organizations for extended periods and can even spend the majority of their careers 
in this field without it becoming a detriment to their promotion opportunities. This is not 
true of the active forces where an officer has to maintain a sea/shore rotation and return to 
serve in their primary community specialty. The expertise will stay in the reserves and 
the personnel in the unit will become highly skilled. They can stay in the units and train 
the new personnel as the slow rotation of personnel occurs. 
Another great advantage of reservists is personnel cost.   It is estimated that the 
cost to maintain one person on active duty is equivalent to about 7.6 reservists (Ref 20). 
Mobilization costs are incurred prior to deployment and during OPERATION DESERT 
STORM the total cost for mobilizing reservists was only a mere $260,416 out of a total 
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$16,100,000 spent on PSYOP during the war (Ref 25, p. 3-3). That is a tremendous asset 
for the 110 reservists activated encompassing the Pennsylvania National Guard and 
multiple Army units where specific skills were sought out and utilized to support the 
effort (Ref 25, p. 3-9). 
5. Billet Structure 
These units Can be established in a similar manner to the San Diego active 
detachment with the exception that it will have less personnel and less hardware. 
Detachments should have a Selected Reserve (SELRES) Commander (0-5) as the 
Officer-in-Charge and a supporting staff can consist of Information Systems Managers, 
Computer Scientists, Computer Network Security Specialists, and Programmers who can 
perform a variety of functions for the Navy. The detachments should also consist of 
personnel with doctoral degrees in psychology, sociology, history, and political scientists 
along with personnel with marketing and sales experience, broadcasting and 
communications, linguists, and technicians. 
The officer billets should be labeled primarily as 1000 coded billets so that any 
qualified officer could fill the billets and not specified by community.    The only 
requirement would be to have the correct subspecialty code that will identify them as IO 
personnel.  The Navy is also proposing a new Information Professional community that 
would incorporate reservists and further aid in identifying individuals for CNO. A Naval 
Reserve Force system could also be developed similar to the active subspecialty code 
system to aid in this mission.   The billets would be described as Computer Network 
Operations, PSYOP, Deception,  and Civil  Affairs  with job descriptions on their 
Individual Training Plans indicating that the person should have a doctoral degree in a 
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specific discipline, a Master's of Science in Computer Science or Information 
Technology, or other related 10 fields. This is due to the fact that extensive training will 
not be available to personnel because of restrictions in active duty and weekend drill 
time. These individuals must have the prerequisite backgrounds to support 10 from the 
start. 
Enlisted personnel should be labeled primarily as Chief Petty Officer (CPO), 
Petty Officer First Class (P01) etc... vice rating specific so that Enlisted Naval 
Reservists with computer skills will not be restricted. For instance, Machinist Mates with 
Masters Degrees in Information Systems should not be prevented from filling a billet as a 
CNO operator. The proposal for creating Information Technology Network (FTN) rating 
would also assist in identifying skilled personnel. These changes should be identified and 
entered into the manning document. The USAR 10 organization is presently 
disregarding Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) codes and relying on civilian 
occupations and educations to identify qualified personnel (Ref 35 p. 15). Enlisted 
Readiness Training Plans should be tailored like the officer plans with the exception that 
it be focused on the technician side. However, if the individual has a higher degree such 
as a Master's Degree in Computer Science or Information Technology it will satisfy the 
Information Technology Technician requirement. 
FTWC is the operational commander and must supervise all training evolutions, 
operations, and support to the fleet. This also includes management of personnel through 
updating requirements in training plans and monitoring their manning to ensure that the 
right personnel are there to support them when needed. FTWC can defer the west coast 
detachments' management to the San Diego detachment for efficiency purposes but the 
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Reserve Liaison Officer (RLO) must coordinate all operations overall and specific 
requests from the fleet during the week for weekend work. 
The utilization and modification of NR FIWC detachments can best utilize the 
expertise in the reserves to support the active forces in Information Operations. The 
advanced technologies in use today require personnel such as Naval Reservists who attain 
and maintain proficiency day-to-day providing a technical base that is difficult to attain 
for frontline forces. The demand in the civilian world for IT personnel is growing and 
more and more sailors are leaving for the private sector. Using reservists to support 
IT/10 is critical as this trend continues. Creativity and innovation are highly needed 
talents in the 10 arena and should be sought out. The utilization of the NR FIWC 
detachments is an inexpensive and effective way to take advantage of the reserve talent. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A.       SUMMARY 
Throughout history, Information Warfare and Information Operations have been 
critical factors in peacetime and surging for conflict as cited throughout Sun Tsu's The 
Art of War (Ref 29). The methods of receiving and disseminating information have 
advanced with technology, allowing more information to move faster than ever before. 
The talent and skill requirements to effectively manage technological changes in the IT 
world and the demand for cultural, psychological and linguistic abilities can be provided 
by the Naval Reserve. 
In investigating history for requisite skills, it was noted that those conducting 10 
were primarily civilians in uniform with talents developed in the civilian sector. 
Barristers, businessmen, financiers, bankers, actors, and many other occupants made up 
the London Controlling Section and Dudley Clarke's 'A' Force.    Outthinking their 
opponents was their primary objective; many even thought of it as a strategic game and 
were   attracted  to  the  excitement  of deception.     In  reference  to  OPERATION 
MINCEMEAT, Ewen Montagu stated: 
My first excursion into crime gave me an understanding of how 
fascinating a criminal's life can be, and why some men and women prefer 
it to any other and, in spite of what some theoreticians may contend, do 
not want tö be reformed (Ref 9, p. 150). 
The same vision and purpose of these individuals can now be found in Naval Reserve 
personnel, who could be best utilized in 10. 
Computer networks are merely an information medium and not information in 
itself. Information comes from people and is the heart and soul of 10, not the computer 
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chip, the disk drive, the Tl line or the router. The skills required to effectively conduct 
10 have traits possessed in many civilian professions, which in turn can be utilized 
through the Naval Reserve to support 10. 
Expanding the use of reservists in 10 will enhance the overall capabilities of the 
Navy. Many skills needed for 10 are difficult to develop with the present rigid sea/shore 
rotation program for Naval Officers who are primarily trained to go to sea and fight ships, 
planes and submarines, not conduct virtual Cyberwar or deception operations. There is 
little time in the normal span of a military career to develop 10 skills, and creating 
another separate specific community will not give the military the continuity it needs due 
to the draw of the civilian world's higher salaries. 
Personnel on active duty have difficulty in maintaining IT proficiency once they 
leave the computer field for their normal sea rotation.. Having a surface line officer go to 
sea for four years, then return to run an IT office or computer network operation with 
new technologies that he or she is not familiar with is not a benefit to the Navy. These 
individuals will spend more time trying to learn the needed skills and will have to transfer 
back to sea again by the time they become proficient. A solution is to use reservists who 
have been working in the field and can provide their civilian trained expertise for many 
of these positions. 
Naval Reservists with cultural experience, doctoral degrees in the social sciences, 
linguists and business professionals are invaluable. The 10 officers need to have the core 
expertise in cultural, political, and psychological implications at their fingertips. 
Blending the Naval Reserve component with regular naval officers will provide the "out 
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of the box"  thinking  combined  with  Fleet experience  needed to  maximize the 
effectiveness of the existing 10 force. 
B.       RECOMMENDATION 
Expanding of the use of the NR FIWC organization consolidates the 10 talent in 
one chain of command to be readily managed and available for utilization. Multiple 
detachments can be established throughout the country to harness civilian professionals 
in such areas as San Jose and Atlanta where concentrations of IT expertise, businessmen 
and university professors exist. FIWC can support agencies and the Fleet with technical 
assistance utilizing the reserves vice having to go to contractors and pay for systems, 
equipment or work that can be provided by its own reserve augmentation force. If the 
CINC 10 officer needs someone with experience in a specific computer system that a 
target is suspected of having or they need some advice on influence in a certain region of 
the world, they can call on the JIOC who can tap FTWC's reserve support. They will 
have a broad background in computer expertise in various systems and an intellectual 
base to support PSYOP/Deception issues. The benefits are reaped when they can provide 
technical solutions for the 10 Officer with an understanding of the implications involving 
10. This may not be readily available from a contractor or from another government 
agency. 
NR FIWC detachments can also be used to provide technical assistance to 
commands and military educational institutions such as Naval Postgraduate School and 
the Naval War College. Large commands with vast computer networks may need to 
utilize NR FIWC detachments to provide computer network expertise for assessments on 
53 
system security. These detachments could conduct assessments for commands and make 
impartial determinations. 
NR FIWC detachments can also provide expertise in area studies with Naval 
Reservists who hold doctoral degrees. Personnel with advanced degrees in area studies 
can be useful in providing expertise in regions of the world where crises arise. Knowing 
that an expert on the Sudan, for example, is located in an NR FIWC detachment provides 
a reach back capability to 10 Officers. This individual may be one of the leading experts 
on the area and presently teaching at a leading institution. This is someone with instant 
credibility and who could provide the expertise greatly needed to the CINC. 
Effective utilization of NR FIWC detachments will enhance the 10 expertise by 
providing low cost and effective personnel that are not readily found on active duty or in 
mission areas not usually supported by the Navy such as CA. By simply utilizing the 
available talents in the form of NR FIWC detachments, a force multiplier will be brought 
into effect. 
The Navy may have valid reasons to reject this proposed use of the Naval Reserve 
in support of the 10 mission areas through FIWC. There are some difficulties involved in 
using reservists in all situations because of time constraints and conflicts that clash with 
their civilian professions. These full time professions, however, are the reason they are 
invaluable in supporting IO mission areas. This research does not advocate using 
reservists as the main force but only as augmentation. This will encourage interaction 
between the Naval Reserve Force and the 10 organizations to actually gain usage of these 
assets, even if in a limited framework. 
54 
Utilization of 10 talent in the Naval Reserve Force will ultimately benefit the 
Fleet and the Naval Reserve Force. By simply utilizing this available talent through 
FIWC, a tremendous force multiplier is brought into effect for use in peacetime and surge 
to conflict situations. In case of conflict, these reservists can provide their traditional role 
as support forces by being quickly activated and ready to provide service to the Fleet. 
The advantage is that the infrastructure will be there to quickly fill the expansion of the 
military with qualified and experienced personnel in this critical mission area. Timing 
and speed is important and each day is crucial in preparing for and conducting 10. The 
expansive talents provided by the diverse makeup of Naval Reservists provide the critical 
impetus essential for future 10 engagements, and must be developed and utilized now. 
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